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Abstract
In this paper, we offer a criticism, inspired by Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations, of the enactivist account of
perception and action. We start by setting up a non-descriptivist naturalism regarding the mind and continue by defining
enactivism and exploring its more attractive theoretical features. We then proceed to analyse its proposal to understand
normativity non-socially. We argue that such a thesis is ultimately committed to the problematic idea that normative
practices can be understood as private and factual. Finally, we offer a characterization of normativity as an essentially
social phenomenon and apply our criticisms to other approaches that share commitments with enactivism.
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1 Introduction
The reports of the death of Cartesianism in the philoso-
phy of mind and of cognitive science have been greatly
exaggerated. The Cartesian understanding of mind has
three prominent features and an implicit background
assumption. The features are: minds are made of non-
physical stuff, minds have privileged, infallible access to
their contents and minds are representational organs.
Dualism, the claim that mind and matter are different
substances, already came into attack in Descartes’ times
and it is difficult to find dualists in the contemporary
scene. Incorrigibility received its due by psychology
from its 19th-century origins. Representationalism,
however, is still the dominant view regarding mind and
cognition. Functionalists in the philosophy of mind
and cognitivists in psychology are well known, and
amply criticized, examples of representationalist
approaches. On the other hand, since the 1970s, anti-
representationalism has become an umbrella term for
philosophers that draw their inspiration from
Wittgenstein, phenomenology, classical American prag-
matism, ecological psychology, and the work of
Donald Davidson and Wilfrid Sellars. Richard Rorty’s
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is the most influen-
tial book within this tradition (Rorty, 1979). However,
with the exception of J. J. Gibson’s groundbreaking
work on affordances, until the crystallization of enacti-
vism, anti-representationalism mainly remained a nega-
tive doctrine. Enactivism has finally put forward
a positive alternative to representationalism to
understand mindfulness, cognition, perception and
agency. We applaud this move and greet the growing
heterodox consensus that enactivist thinkers are man-
aging to achieve around their approach.
Enactivism is a new paradigm for explaining life,
cognition, and the relation between the two (Stewart,
Gapenne, & Di Paolo, 2010). This approach to cogni-
tion is not a straightforward theory. Rather, it is a fam-
ily of theories based on mutually supporting core
concepts such as self-stability, self-assembly, sense-
making, embodiment, emergence, autopoiesis, agency
and action-perception (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009).1
We can classify the different enactive theories into
two major groups: first, there is an enactive approach
for explaining what it is to be a living being, accompa-
nied by an account of perception and action taken as
biological processes. Among the authors espousing this
first type of enactivism we can find early philosophers
such as Jonas (1968) or Maturana and Varela (1980).
More recent developments in this tradition by Di Paolo
(2005), Barandiaran, Di Paolo, & Rohde (2009) and
Barandiaran and Egbert (2013) join theoretical pre-
mises with results from computational and robotic
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models in order to provide a naturalist explanation of
the connection between life and mind. The second
major enactive approach is often related to perception.
Perception and sensation are not rigidly demarcated in
the enactive approach to perception, and this is why we
can find a sensorimotor account of taste (Noe¨, 2004),
smell (Cooke & Myin, 2011) or touch (O’Regan, 2011).
Also, the enactive approach has been used to make
explicit how this enactive or sensorimotor account pro-
vides new ways of understanding informational content
(Hutto & Myin, 2013). As we said, we share the main
theoretical drive, away from representations, with both
groups, but our criticisms will be centred on some theses
put forward by the first group. Section 2 of this paper
offers a detailed account of the aspects of enactivism
that we find more attractive. Section 3.1 provides the
philosophical background needed to put our criticisms
in context. Section 3.2 is the core of this paper: in it we
make use of Wittgenstein’s arguments in favour of the
intrinsically social character of normativity to challenge
the idea that non-social agents do establish and follow
norms or rules (we use both terms interchangeably fol-
lowing the standard philosophical custom). Sections 4
and 5 sketch some ideas about future work and offer a
conclusion. The rest of this introduction is a brief sum-
mary of the ideas that we will explain in section 3.1.
Our point of departure is the following: once that
the three central features of Cartesianism are rejected,
there is still a background assumption made by
Descartes and only questioned by some philosophers of
language and mind in the 20th century: the idea that all
our vocabulary, all our explanatory practices, all our
attempts at making sense of reality, have a descriptive,
factual character. There must be something (some fact,
some property, some event) that makes true our state-
ments, whether they are physical, biological, logical,
epistemological or ethical. This descriptivist prejudice
is, itself, a form of representationalism, this time
regarding language. The truth or falsity of a sentence
depends on their being or not a corresponding, the fact
that the sentence aims at describing. Even Rorty, who
coined the term ‘anti-representationalism’, felt under
this linguistic trap.2 Most varieties of naturalism are
descriptivist-cum-factualist in this sense. What makes
them naturalist is their refusal to accept non-natural,
spectral, spooky facts. The facts that make true or false
our normative evaluations must be just plain, natural
facts, those disclosed by the natural sciences.
However, this is far from being the only kind of nat-
uralism. In section 3, we will develop at length some
Wittgensteinian arguments regarding the character of
normative practices. Here we want to mention another
aspect of his philosophy that has taken a longer time to
digest by the philosophical and scientific community.
Both in his early and late work, Wittgenstein rejected
the continuity between philosophy and empirical
research. The most influential forms of naturalism
(those inaugurated by Quine’s claim that epistemology
was a branch of psychology) do precisely the opposite.
Nevertheless, at the core of Wittgenstein’s misgivings
about the relevance of empirical research for philoso-
phy there is a deeply naturalist thought: we are natural
beings that relate to reality by means of a number of
mutually irreducible games, the descriptive, empirical
one being one amongst them. Other language-games
do not refer to special, non-natural entities, but play
different functions: evaluating, giving orders, asking
questions, making inferences, joking, expressing our
thoughts and feelings, coordinating our activities and
so on. To model every language-game on the natural
sciences is, in the words of Austin (1962), to fall on a
descriptive fallacy.
The conception of philosophy that follows from this
is, against first appearances, highly modest: there is no
need to postulate, say, mathematical, logical, epistemo-
logical or moral entities that only the philosopher can
know. On the contrary, philosophy’s only function is
to help philosophers (and those under their influence)
to escape their own metaphysical constructions, and a
method to achieve this end is to do a kind of concep-
tual analysis that respects our everyday linguistic prac-
tices. Highly modest, and yet highly subversive: natural
language speakers are the ultimate owners of their form
of life and nothing that philosophy says can go against
their usage. Furthermore, there is no hidden mystery
that gives philosophers the higher moral ground, no
moral facts, no moral universal principles, knowledge
of which would elevate them over mere mortals.
Normative evaluation is neither empirically natural nor
sublimely supernatural; it is an expression of natural
capacities to make sense of the world.3
If we apply this framework to our mental, cognitive
vocabulary, we can make full sense of Wittgenstein’s dis-
cussion of intentionality and sensations: when we talk
about someone’s beliefs or reasons or pains (be them our-
selves’ or others’) we do not describe internal goings-on or
refer to queer,4 private entities. We rather situate actions
and feelings within a framework that tries to make sense
of them. Gilbert Ryle’s attack on the myth of the ‘ghost of
the machine’ should be read on the same lines: subtracting
the Cartesian ghost should not leave us with a Cartesian
machine because one depends on the other. Rejecting
dualism should lead us to reject its underlying descripti-
vism. The fact that Ryle is still read as a philosophical
behaviourist is to ignore the centrality of his anti-descripti-
vism: mental vocabulary does not describe behaviour
because it does not describe anything at all.
2 Enactivism and naturalization of
normativity
Enactivism has always been a strongly biologically
based naturalist project. The main aim of this approach
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is to define what it is to be a living being. This endea-
vour has been recently supported by the modelling of
basic biological functions, such as chemotaxis (Egbert,
Barandiaran, & Di Paolo, 2012) or metabolic processes
(Barandiaran & Moreno, 2008). Among the achieve-
ments of this approach, perhaps the most important
has been the development of a certain understanding of
the notion of agency: while evolutionary biology
emphasizes natural selection in order to explain biologi-
cal functions of certain anatomical and physiological
parts of agents, certain varieties of enactivism explains
biological functions, for example, appealing to the
maintenance of the organizational scheme that shapes
the agent or the system (Christiansen & Bickhard,
2002; Saborido, Mossio, & Moreno, in press). Agency
is the product of a set of distinct networked systems
that, taken together, enable the emergence of a new
entity: the agent as a whole. The first step of this project
is accounting for individuality: in the original autopoie-
tic formulation, an agent is understood as composed of
a series of internal processes that, once assembled, gen-
erate a certain type of stability that does not depend on
external factors. However, one of the advantages of Di
Paolo’s (2005, 2009) version of enactivism is that his
theory emphasized how the environment plays a funda-
mental role on the constitution of agency, because pro-
cesses in which the agent as a whole interacts with its
outer environment also contribute to the maintenance
of the agent (metabolism, etc.) and help to understand
key concepts in the enactivist view, such as ‘sense-mak-
ing’, ‘viability’ or ‘adaptivity’. However, external fac-
tors cannot determine, in a strong sense, the agent’s
operation or activity. Thus, the result of its own regula-
tion is the generation of a unity separated from the
outer environment (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009).
These self-assembled systems that establish their own
individuality are networked via recursive interactions
among them, and this fact accounts for the inner sus-
tainability of the agent as a whole. The product of these
assembled networked processes (metabolic, nervous,
circulatory, etc.) is a full biological agent, which is able
to keep its own autonomy through space and time.5
This shaping is what Varela (1979, 1997) defined as the
operational closure of the system: there is no primary
system for constituting agency; on the contrary, if we
want to analyse the enabling conditions of agency and
the roles of the different systems, we will be guided
from one to another until realizing that all of them are
mutually supportive.6 This leaves the agent in a situa-
tion of precariousness (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007):
without this special regulative organization, the same
processes of the different systems would tend to dissi-
pate under the same physical conditions. If some of the
interdependencies cease to produce their own outputs
required by other processes, there could be a propaga-
tion of dysfunction that may reduce or destroy the via-
bility of the system (Christensen & Bickhard, 2002).
Thus, if all this regulative organization or assembly of
systems is what allows for the viability of the higher
system (the agent), we can claim that the product of this
assembly becomes a condition at the same time: the
recently emerged agent needs to keep its own indivi-
duality in order to survive. This is the sense in which
there is room to talk about biological normativity: the
agent is produced by itself, and its goal (and also the
goal of every subsystem) consists in maintaining its
own self-production. As it is claimed, ‘[s]elf production
is a process that becomes a unity and a norm: to keep
the unity going and distinct’ (Di Paolo, 2005, p. 434).
Now we can understand why an agent is an autonomous
system: because there is a co-emergence of its own indi-
viduality (auto) and normativity (nomos) –which is
nothing but to ensure its own identity through time. At
this point, we can define a biological notion of norma-
tivity: the one related to self-production and autopoi-
esis, which is highly related to autonomy, being the one
that shapes agency (all along with individuality and
asymmetry, as explained in Barandiaran et al., 2009).
This normativity of biological processes is also pres-
ent in cognitive phenomena. This autopoietic or purely
biological self-productive normativity is not identical to
the normativity of cognition, although it is necessary
for it. Within this perspective, cognition, as any other
biological process, is part of the set of functions that
shape agency and contribute to preserving it. Cognition
is explained as an agent–environment coupling in which
perception, rather than being a matter of logical com-
putation, is understood as adaptive behaviour (the
online and spatiotemporally extended regulation of the
agent as a whole with its own environment). This
agent–environment coupling is understood as a sensori-
motor loop by which every action of the agent produces
a different sensation (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch,
1991). Some loops are more useful for the stability of
the agent than others, and those become more salient
or meaningful. Thus, within the history of this frame-
work, classical and internalist enactivism (Maturana &
Varela, 1980) was extended in order to include the situ-
ated aspects of action and perception that contribute to
the current enactivist view of agency (Di Paolo, 2005).
2.1 Adaptivity and sense-making
Unlike early enactivists, autopoiesis is neither the only
source of normativity nor the only possible notion of
‘normativity’ within the contemporary enactive
approach. Autopoiesis is a way of defining normativity
by an all-or-nothing explanation: if the structural cou-
pling with the environment is maintained even when
certain interactions result in perturbations of the autop-
oietic dynamics with no loss of organization in the sys-
tem, then everything that does not result in a loss of
organization could be valued as something good (or at
least ‘not bad’) for the organism (Maturana, 1975;
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Varela et al., 1991). This is called the ‘conservation per-
spective’. But recent developments showed that the
conservation perspective is a very narrow explanation
that cannot account for all the normative aspects of the
living and the cognitive in the enactive framework. As
Di Paolo claims (2005, p. 439, italics added): ‘Events
that provoke the same regulative response are not
meaningfully distinguishable.’ So, the normative aspect
for addressing meaningful or valuable aspects of the
organism’s surroundings must be explained in a differ-
ent way. These authors, instead of an all-or-nothing
view on normativity, propose that meaningfully distin-
guishable aspects are responded to in graded ways. The
idea behind sense-making is to account for such valu-
able or meaningful aspects. Thus, the notion of ‘adap-
tivity’, developed by Di Paolo (2005, 2009), offers a
new way for understanding sense-making in a much
finer way, and also introduces a new notion of norma-
tivity within the enactive framework.
Adaptivity is defined as follows (Di Paolo, 2005,
p. 438):
A system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to regulate its
states and its relation to the environment with the result
that, if the states are sufficiently close to the boundary of
viability,
1. Tendencies are distinguished and acted upon
depending on whether the states will approach or
recede from the boundary and, as a consequence,
2. Tendencies of the first kind are moved closer to or
transformed into tendencies of the second and so
future states are prevented from reaching the bound-
ary with an outward velocity.
As we see, adaptivity is ‘a special manner of being tol-
erant to challenges by actively monitoring perturba-
tions and compensating for their tendencies’ (Di Paolo,
2005, p. 438). This new capacity would come, then, in
the agent’s monitorizing and compensating (regulating)
its own behaviour. ‘Both elements, self-monitoring and
appropriate regulation, are necessary to be able to
speak of meaning from the perspective of the organism’
(Di Paolo, 2005, p. 438).
Di Paolo’s (2005) notion of adaptivity offers a new
way to understand the specific normativity that goes
beyond the all-or-nothing picture of autopoietic nor-
mativity in which there are no meaningful distinctions
of the events that surround the system. These meaning-
ful distinctions that the agent is able to discriminate
through adaptivity give rise to a new notion: sense-
making. Sense-making is the concept that enactivists
use for explaining the elements that became salient,
meaningful or valuable in their environments after a
considerable number of regulative interactions with
them (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). A simple
unicellular system such as a bacterium develops its own
sense-making through, say, different orientations in a
sugar gradient. The different movements that the bac-
terium is able to perform are regulated depending on
the concentration of sugar. The bacterium uses the
sugar as a source of nutrients, but sugar’s edibility is
not an intrinsic property: it is only valuable in relation
to the agent that takes advantage of it. Thus, sugar
becomes valuable for the organism because it is an ele-
ment of its environment that allows for its sustainabil-
ity (inasmuch as it provides a nutrient that supplies
energy to the agent and thus lets it maintain its auton-
omy). Those valuable features of the environment have
also a normative character – in this case, if the agent
does not keep up its relation with environmental sugar
it will probably die. Normativity is, then, realized in
every biological process. It is stated (appealing to this
definition and also to empirical data; Barandiaran &
Egbert, 2013) that an agent such as the bacterium is
able to establish and follow its own norm. Hence,
sense-making is a common feature of every living
being, from bacteria to humans, because every agent,
in the words of Thompson and Stapleton (2009), is able
to transform its own world into a place of salience and
value and, for this reason, sense-making is a normative
activity. According to Di Paolo (2005) and Thompson
and Stapleton (2009), there are graded norms of vitality
because organisms regulate their activity in ways that
improves their conditions for autonomy.
By emphasizing the role of active regulations of
agents or organisms with their environments, adaptiv-
ity suggests that in sense-making there are graded
norms of vitality (health, sickness, stress, fatigue, etc.).
These graded norms are the product of the continuous
regulation of the organism’s activity, which improves
its conditions for autonomy. Mere autopoiesis, given
its conservative character, only concerns the regulations
of the states of the agent based on the conditions of
viability, transforming its milieu according to the inter-
nal norms of its activity (Thompson & Stapleton,
2009). Autopoiesis only provides a self-distinct physical
system that can be the centre of a perspective and a
self-maintained precarious network of processes (Di
Paolo, 2005, p. 439). In contrast, adaptivity ‘allows the
system to appreciate its encounters with respect to this
[normative autopoietic] condition, its own death, in a
graded and relational manner while it is still alive’ (Di
Paolo, 2005, p. 439). So, the normativity of autopoietic
maintenance reveals itself as insufficient for evaluating
the events of the environment in a gradual way. For
that, we require adaptivity.
Autopoiesis, thus, is insufficient for sense-making if
it is not complemented with adaptivity. According to
Di Paolo’s claim (2005, p. 439), autopoiesis allows for
the creation of a system, while adaptivity is the way in
which that system is able to value its own encounters
with the environment. Here we will talk about (at least)
Heras-Escribano et al. 23
two different kinds of normativity: one established by
self-construction or autopoiesis, and the other provided
by sense-making, which requires autopoiesis and adap-
tivity. As Di Paolo puts it (2005, p. 438, italics added):
‘If sense-making requires the acquisition of ‘a valence
which is dual at its basis: attraction or rejection,
approach or escape’ (Weber & Varela, 2002, p. 117), a
sense-making system requires, apart from the norm
given by self-construction, access to how it currently
stands against the all-or-nothing barrier given by that
norm.’
2.2 From individual to social interaction:
participatory sense-making
Until few years ago, there was not an independent the-
ory in the enactive paradigm for explaining social inter-
action. But recently, some authors (De Jaegher & Di
Paolo, 2007) propound a new theory within the enactive
framework for understanding social interaction in enac-
tive terms. The enactive account of social interaction is
known as participatory sense-making. This approach to
social cognition uses the key concepts of enactivism’s
non-social cognition (such as sense-making), or even
some enactive biological concepts (such as the opera-
tional closure), in order to explain social interaction,
which reinforces the naturalist project of enactivism
and also provides a new way for linking the biological,
the cognitive and the social.
Which is their particular field of study? With ‘social
interactions’, they ‘refer to the face-to-face encounters
of everyday life. These encounters range from brief and
superficial to deep and extensive’ (De Jaegher & Di
Paolo, 2007, p. 486). Also, participatory sense-making,
through the application of enactive concepts for
explaining these social interactions, can account for
these encounters in the way this interactive experience
is described in everyday language (De Jaegher, Di
Paolo, & Gallagher, 2010, p. 442). The range of interac-
tions they define as ‘social’ is so wide that they include
our social and well-established practices like dancing or
talking (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 494), and also
the interactions that we humans establish with other
animals or even with robots (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p.
443). But not all kinds of interaction fall under this
concept. For example, bumping into each other on a
busy street would not be a social interaction. On the
contrary, social interaction seems to require a regula-
tive aspect: ‘A conversation about a sponge is a social
interaction, because the participants decide upon the
topic together, regulate beginning, course and ending
of the dialogue, and their autonomy (neither as living
beings, nor as conversation partners) is not destroyed
in the process’ (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 493,
italics added).
The tools for describing this regulative and interac-
tive process are mathematical, mainly coordination
dynamics (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). In summary,
social interaction is defined as ‘[t]wo or more autono-
mous agents co-regulating their coupling with the effect
that their autonomy is not destroyed and their rela-
tional dynamics acquire an autonomy of their own.
Examples: conversations, collaborative work, argu-
ments, collective action, dancing and so on’ (De
Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 441). Thus, with the concept and
the range of examples clear, we can move forward in
order to understand how these authors provide an enac-
tive explanation of the emergence of social interactions.
In order to explain this unique cognitive phenom-
enon, the authors claim that social interaction demands
a new, independent level of analysis, and that the fea-
tures that emerge at this level cannot be reduced to its
components: ‘The interaction process emerges as an
entity when social encounters acquire this operationally
closed organization. It constitutes a level of analysis
not reducible, in general, to individual behaviors’ (De
Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007, p. 492). The words ‘as an
entity’ are very important: this means that there is an
ontological and not just a methodological emergence of
a new level of explanation. The new entity really pos-
sesses the features or properties that enactivists recog-
nize they have, such as certain normative aspect. How
do they explain the emergence of this new entity? There
are some conditions for this new, social level to emerge:
‘[G]iven X, and a particular situation in which X
occurs, F is a contextual factor if variations in F pro-
duce variations in X, C is an enabling condition if the
absence of C prevents X from occurring, and P is a
constitutive element if P is part of the processes that
produce X’ (De Jaegher et al., 2010, p. 443). If these
conditions are fulfilled, the authors claim, then the new
entity would emerge and we could talk properly of a
new cognitive level describable in enactive terms.
Thus, social interaction is a new emergent level
whose autonomy can be accounted for within the enac-
tive approach if we adequately expand sense-making
from the individual to the social. As it is explained in
De Jaegher and Di Paolo (2007, p. 504):
We do not experience the other-in-interaction as totally
obscure and inaccessible, nor as fully transparent (like an
object fully constituted by my sense-making activity), but
as something else: a protean pattern with knowable and
unknowable surfaces and angles of familiarity that shape-
shift as the interaction unfolds. Those patterns of change
are influenced by my own participation in the emergence
and breakdown of joint relational sense-making, hence
they are not totally alien. My actions contribute to define
the other-in-interaction not so much as my squeezing con-
tributes to the experience of softness of the sponge but
rather in ways that do not necessarily settle into a lawful
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relationship. I must alter my actions contextually in order
to reencounter the other and in the process, sometimes, be
encountered myself when her sense-making unexpectedly
modulates my own. This recursive effect on my actions
describes the co-modulation of self-in-interaction and
other-in-interaction.
As we can see, the enactive picture goes from the
biological to the social, and we can find (at least) two
different notions of normativity involved. First, the pri-
mitive, non-social normativity of autopoiesis and self-
production; second, the normativity of sense-making,
that requires autopoiesis and adaptivity as necessary
features for its emergence. This normativity of sense
making is found in non-social cognition as well as in
social interaction (participatory sense-making).
After this detailed account of the enactive definitions
of normativity, in the following sections we will classify
both notions of normativity as belonging to the general
descriptivist framework. In section 3.1 we develop the
non-descriptivist account of normativity and in section
3.2 we offer some Wittgensteinian arguments as a study
case that could be applied to this enactive notions of
normativity. To support our defence of the non-
descriptivist account of normativity we will adapt some
classic Wittgensteinian arguments on rule following
(Wittgenstein, 1953). We will hold that attributing nor-
mativity to the actions of non-social living beings can
lead to a confusion of levels of explanation, even if it is
done on the basis of their biological responses or on
the idea that those responses are grounded on an indi-
vidual interpretation of the environment (the sense-
making proposed by enactivist authors).
3 A non-descriptive, normativist
approach to mind and cognition
3.1 Non-descriptivism and non-explicit normativity
A norm-following approach to cognition needs not be
based on the idea of following explicit general rules to
guide behaviour. In this sense, it does not need to rely
on an algorithmic-based, cognitivist and intellectualist
interpretation of what is normativity. Intellectualism
(the idea that an agent, in order to act, must compute
explicit general maxims or rules in its mind prior to
behaviour) was rejected by Gilbert Ryle (1949), one of
the leading philosophers of the norm-following expla-
nation of cognition. For that purpose, he made a capi-
tal distinction (used in epistemology and philosophy of
action since then), between ‘knowing-that’ and ‘know-
ing-how’. While the know-that approach is used to
characterize explicit, discursive or propositional knowl-
edge (such as purely intellectual knowledge, i.e., mathe-
matical or some other theoretical knowledge), the
know-how approach to cognition is the one related to
action, skilful abilities and perception. This kind of
knowledge is not discursive, propositional or explicit. It
could be put into words, but a linguistic expression of
that way of acting does not exhaust the normative
aspect of the know-how knowledge: this normative
aspect is expressed in the mastery of the skills or abil-
ities themselves applied to each particular situation.
And this coping in every particular situation cannot be
exhausted by a linguistic maxim or rule, because that
general rule just expresses the general aspects of that
particular ability, not the distinctive and particular fea-
tures that the agent deals with in specific situations.
Often, for explaining how somebody masters a par-
ticular ability, we require certain degree of reasonabil-
ity that, we will argue, comes from the agent’s being
part of a community of shared practices. Without this
requirement, it could be impossible to explain the nor-
mative behaviour of an agent, because it is the only
way to explain how the agent is acting for reasons. For
example, we could claim that somebody exercised her
skills in order to fulfil the task, or that she acted in a
certain way because she thought it was the best thing to
do. Our intentional vocabulary is irreducible for
explaining behaviour. It is the most primitive tool that
we have to distinguish mere causal triggerings from
proper normative actions that bound our behaviour as
cognitive creatures.
So, by emphasizing normativity, what we have here
is not an intellectualist approach to action and percep-
tion similar to the ones endorsed by cognitivism and the
GOFAI view of artificial intelligence. This is because,
as Travis (2000, p. 210) claims: ‘There is no algorithm
for reasonableness’. Rather, agents that know how to
deal with their environments are able to discriminate
the relevant features they have to attend to and also
which are the pertinent responses that agents must pro-
vide in order to respond correctly to them. This is the
difference between a mere descriptive (fact-stating)
stance and a normative stance towards the explanation
of our actions and perceptions. If we explain our
actions normatively, we provide an explanation in
terms of abilities and not just in terms of facts. Thus,
agents through their abilities can cope with the environ-
ment in different ways and moments, and a scientific
explanation of each particular execution of the ability
cannot exhaust the normative character of their abil-
ities. This is useful for explaining action and perception,
but this normative view goes further. There are several
philosophical positions that take as their starting point
a non-descriptivist norm-following general framework.
Semantic and moral particularism are two interest-
ing examples (Dancy, 1993, 2004; McDowell, 1979,
1998; Travis, 2000). Semantic particularism defends the
idea that the semantic contribution of the same term in
every speech act depends on the distinctive features of
the context in which it is uttered. Moral particularism
claims that ethical evaluation is not based on general
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maxims (such as categorical imperatives or universal
commandments). Ethical decisions depends on the sen-
sibility of the agent to the specific demands of particu-
lar moral contexts: ‘Occasion by occasion, one knows
what to do, if one does, not by applying universal prin-
ciples but by being a certain kind of person: one who
sees situations in a certain distinctive way’ (McDowell,
1979, p. 374). Two actions of the same kind may have
radically different moral valences in different situations
and no general maxim can capture such context-
sensitivity.
Related to particularism, semantic and moral
expressivism (Blackburn, 1993; Brandom, 1994, 2001;
Fra´polli, 2012; Fra´polli & Villanueva, 2012; Gibbard,
1990, 2012), there are claims that not all our statements
about the world are descriptive (i.e., they do not state
facts of nature); rather, some of them play the function
of expressing an evaluative attitude of the agent with
respect to certain features of the world. Expressivist
views are not only found in semantics and in ethics, but
also in broader areas such as epistemology and meta-
physics. Huw Price’s (2011, 2013) approach to natural-
ism applies this expressivist idea to what he calls ‘object
naturalism’, which he accuses of being descriptive and
hence representational. From semantics to metaphy-
sics, anti-descriptivism is a solid and increasingly influ-
ential stance towards cognition.
This norm-following and non-descriptivist stance,
exemplified in all these views, outlines the primitive
character of normativity in order to characterize action
and perception. The main feature of non-descriptivism
is the primitive character of a non-explicit and non-
intellectualist view of normativity. Starting with the
work of Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953), it is one
of the most powerful opponents of the traditional, intel-
lectualist, cognitivist and formalist approach to explain
cognition in all its levels, from perception and action to
language and ethics.
Contrary to non-descriptivism, any descriptivist
approach to normativity implies a factualist assump-
tion. Our explanations of cognition are taken to be
descriptive, on a par with the explanations of the natu-
ral sciences. To describe an agent as being aware of
some feature in its environment is to do the same kind
of thing as (let us say, in the sciences of the non-living)
attributing a certain weight to a subatomic particle or
as describing the mechanics of the sodium-potassium
pump. For enactivism, cognition is considered a fact,
or a process, that is describable by science, and our nat-
ural language expressions should be part of an explana-
tion whose statements directly refer to certain scientific
facts or properties.
The problem of the descriptivist approach is that
this strategy does not suffice to explain the intrinsic
normativity of our mental abilities. Then, the task is to
clarify what we mean when we claim that certain action
has been performed following a norm. One typical
conclusion that comes to our minds when we claim that
the normative aspects of our abilities are not reducible
to describable facts is the intuition that this idea could
entail that abilities and skills are spooky entities or pro-
cesses. But nothing is further from the truth. To put it
in Ryle’s words (1949/2009, p. 22):
Now a skill is not an act. It is therefore neither a witnessa-
ble nor an unwitnessable act. To recognise that a perfor-
mance is an exercise of a skill is indeed to appreciate it in
the light of a factor which could not be separately recorded
by a camera. But the reason why the skill exercised in a
performance cannot be separately recorded by a camera is
not that it is an occult or ghostly happening, but that it is
not a happening at all.
In Ryle’s view, skills or abilities are not identical with
the actions or exercises that manifest them, or with any
scientifically measurable property or parameter. The
point that Ryle highlights is that not every explanato-
rily relevant discourse is referential (this is, related to a
particular set of facts). From a descriptivist point of
view, when we claim that some agent possesses a skill
(say, the capacity to act in such and such a way, or to
infer this from that) we are asserting a matter of fact.
In contrast, from a non-descriptivist point of view,
when we claim that an agent possesses certain skills, we
express an evaluation of a range of situations. Those
expressions do not need to describe or stand for certain
entities in the world neither they represent them;
instead, they evaluate whether the agent that performs
an action or makes a statement is satisfying certain cri-
teria of correctness.
The idea that our normative assessments do not play
a descriptive role is independent from the complexity of
the action under evaluation. In this sense, the problem
of scaling up,7 important though it is, is a symptom of
a deeper malaise: the reason why social norms cannot
be grounded on biological, empirically describable,
norms is not their greater complexity, but the fact that
norms cannot be grounded on facts. As it should be
clear by now, the problem of descriptivism about the
mind is not merely that the enactivist approach faces
insurmountable difficulties when the cognitive com-
plexity escalates, for instance, when the agent is part of
a social community. The problem is already there even
for minimally cognitive agents: when we say that an
agent (for instance, a bacterium) is searching, avoiding,
intending or wanting we are not describing the agent,
but interpreting, making sense of its behaviour. The
difficulty that we want to highlight is not that enacti-
vism is in a position to describe simple agents but lacks
the resources when it comes to linguistic creatures, fully
introduced into social customs and practices. The prob-
lem is a deeper one: understanding any agent’s beha-
viour goes beyond offering an empirical and
mathematical account of its movements.
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This is the essence of Wittgenstein’s discussion of
rule-following. Taking a normative approach to certain
phenomena is not searching for normative facts, on a
pair with, say, chemical or physiological facts, but tak-
ing a kind of stance on behaviour without which (if the
normative approach is adequate) we cannot even place
our empirical discoveries within any framework.
Neither general rules, nor the agreement of the commu-
nity nor an interpretation of the rule are sufficient to
evaluate in terms of normative standards (though they
may be necessary for introducing someone into norma-
tive practices). We have agential vocabulary to make
sense of the living in terms that are not those of the
physical sciences. But we do not need to embrace the
idea that actions or norms are entities along with
atoms, molecules, bacteria or gorillas.
Rules or norms8 have been a subject of heated dis-
cussion in contemporary philosophy. There are two
especially influential landmarks in the debate:
Wittgenstein’s (1953) rule-following considerations in
his Philosophical Investigations and Saul Kripke’s con-
troversial interpretation of Wittgenstein (Kripke,
1982). Wittgenstein argues against several targets:
amongst them, Platonistic or Kantian takes, that
demand general, universal principles or maxims in
order to ground particular normative evaluations, and
factualist accounts that understand normative state-
ments as descriptions of parcels of reality, laden with
normative properties. One thing is clear: Wittgenstein
gives a central role to the social in his discussion. He
insists time and time again on practices, training, cus-
toms or the impossibility of following a rule privately.
A rule cannot be followed only once or only by one
agent. However, it is easy to find convincing counterex-
ample to that simple formulation: surely someone can
invent, say, a patience or solitaire card game, play it
correctly a couple of times and then forget about it. Or
Robinson Crusoe, a favourite within the discussion,
can give names to the trees in his island and be consis-
tent in his usage. Are these cases of private rule-follow-
ing? Self-correction, on the other hand, is a common
feature of rule-followers. Tired of dripping milk every
time that she uses a tetra brik, Mary tries to hold it the
other way around and the spilling is over. If the com-
munity plays a necessary role for normativity, it does
not seem to be to watch over every instance of follow-
ing a rule, or establishing one. What then?
As we understand him, Wittgenstein’s main points
are two: (1) normative practices cannot be grounded on
normative facts, and (2) a private model of rule-
following (and norm-establishing) is highly proble-
matic. We have already dwelled on the first issue. Now
we will concentrate on the second. What is a private
model of rule-following? It is an account of normative
phenomena that accepts as normative actions that, as a
matter of principle, can only be performed by one
agent. Paradigmatic examples in the debate make
reference to private, mental entities (pains, intentions,
expectations, etc.). Wittgenstein cannot be discarding
the possibility that I feel my pain in silence, think about
it (for instance, think about what drug to take to ease
the pain), take an aspirin and move on without anyone
else being involved in the process. What he discards as
nonsensical is the idea of private objects of introspec-
tion that are, as a matter of principle, beyond the reach
of everybody else. If my thoughts and feelings (or my
solitaire game, or Crusoe’s naming practices, or Mary’s
tetra brik clever trick) are not sharable, then they are
not thoughts, feelings, games, practices or tricks. They
do not need to be actually shared; they only need to be
potentially shared (susceptible to be shared) by others
to count as proper practices or thoughts.
I can establish and follow a rule in solitude. For it to
be established or followed privately, in Wittgenstein’s
sense of privacy, the rule would need to be understood
only by me. If no one could be in a position to judge
whether I am acting correctly according to the rule that
I myself have established, there is no justification to
speak about following it. Furthermore, Wittgenstein
emphasizes the need to distinguish between ‘it seems
right to me’ and ‘it is right’. For a realm to be norma-
tive, there must be room for error and correction, but
there must also be room for the agent to realize that it
has erred. A creature unaware of the possibility of a
gap between her actual behaviour and a better option
cannot be evaluated in normative terms (think of a two-
year old child using swear words). Sometimes others
make us aware of our mistakes, sometimes we realize
on our own. But, how does the awareness originate?
We claim, following Wittgenstein, that it comes from
our being initiated in normative, social practices. Once
that we are introduced in them, we may establish and
follow practices on our own, without being trained by
someone else. The crucial role of the community is not
to correct us permanently, but to show us that, some-
times, what seems correct is not correct.
Wittgenstein opposition to what could be called
interpretativism shows both his challenges to intellectu-
alist conceptions of rule-following (to follow a rule is to
subsume an action under a general principle) and to
the private model of rule-following. If normativity were
merely a case of acting in agreement with a general
maxim, in order to evaluate whether an action is cor-
rect or incorrect we would need to offer an interpreta-
tion of the rule for the specific case that shows whether
there is accordance or disagreement with the rule. But
the interpretation itself would still be subject to inter-
pretation, inasmuch as it retains the universality of the
rule being interpreted. This point will be made clearer
in the next section.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein’s account is a definition
of the conditions to talk of rule-following and rule-
establishing. As we will see, both are properly under-
stood only within a social framework. In the following
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section, we will analyse Wittgenstein’s discussion on
what is to establish and follow a rule as a case of study
to diagnose the descriptivist and factualist assumption
of enactivism regarding normativity.
3.2 A case study: the Wittgensteinian account on
norm-following and norm-establishing
In this section, we intend to challenge the notion of
enactivist normativity taking inspiration from two
Wittgenstenian arguments. First, we will focus on the
idea that immediate and untrained biological reactions
cannot be considered as normative. Then we will ques-
tion the notion that individual interpretations of certain
stimuli are sufficient to be considered as normative
responses to them. After that, we will take individual
interpretations to be analogous to the idea of sense-
making. Even when the different examples could be
considered as equally biologically brute, differentiating
between the two of them – the untrained reaction and
the individual interpretation – will be useful for high-
lighting different aspects of normativity that are missed
in the enactivist account.
As we have seen, enactivism takes normativity to
permeate all biological and cognitive functions. But,
from a certain perspective, this supposed normative
character of natural reactions fails to satisfy some spe-
cific requirements for something to be classified as nor-
mative. One of the clearest examples comes from
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953), in
which the author places us in a situation where some-
body is teaching a pupil to count, and the teacher won-
ders why, after many repetitions, the student is still not
doing it correctly. The first explanation of the student’s
behaviour is always to appeal to his natural reaction,
and the distinction between natural reactions and the
right course of action that counting demands suggests
that we can distinguish between acting according to
one’s natural dispositions and acting correctly – acting
according to a rule. So, following a rule seems to be
something much more complex than naturally reacting.
If all there is to following a rule were to act according
to one’s untrained reactions, then there would be no
situation where learning could be thought to be neces-
sary to coming to act in the right way.
When we explain the normative character of a skilful
activity like counting, we attend only to the right
actions that an agent has to perform in order to count.
And the rule for counting numbers is different from the
rules that guide other actions or practices. We cannot
explain the normativity of a certain skill appealing just
to the probable role that this skill could play in sustain-
ing the individual. This is why we can take all actions
of an agent to be subsumed under the normative label,
but this is insufficient to account for the normative
aspect of each action or skill.
The other Wittgensteinian example that is revealing
in this context concerns the intelligibility of individual
interpretations (PI §§198–202). When discussing
whether acting according to a norm can be understood
as offering an interpretation such that the action
becomes subsumable by the rule, Wittgenstein comes
back to the example of the pupil learning mathematics.
After some successful tests that seemed to show that he
has mastered the use of the ‘+ ’ sign (all involving
numbers smaller than 1000), the teacher asks him ‘how
much is 1000+2?’ The student answers ‘1004’. When
the teacher tells him that this is not the right answer, he
defends himself claiming that he is doing exactly what
he was told: ‘I did as before. Wasn’t the rule: add 2 up
to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on?’ (PI
§185). The student has managed to provide an interpre-
tation of the rule behind the use of the ‘+ ’ sign that
covers all possible uses of the sign and is consistent
with all the examples he was exposed to during his
learning. It is tempting to say that the pupil can act in
accordance with his own criterion. But we will show
later why this cannot be a proper account of rule-
following.
This example parallels the enactivist idea of sense-
making as an explanation of normativity. Sense-mak-
ing is the interactional and relational side of autonomy
because while establishing its own maintenance, the
organism establishes a perspective by which its interac-
tions with its environment acquire a normative status
(Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). Every agent develops
its own sense-making, which is to say that different
aspects of the environment mean something different
for every agent. In that vein, the answer of each agent
to the same stimulus could be different without any
need of error or contradiction. Sense-making, then, can
be understood as a particular interpretation of a certain
stimuli in the own environment of every agent.
The Wittgensteinian example fits with sense-making
examples if it is understood as an agent answering to a
certain stimulus in a sui generis way that is valuable to
it. In the Wittgensteinian case, a symbolic stimulus
(‘+ ’) is interpreted in a way in which the agent as a
whole accounts for a linguistic expression. In this sense,
the expression of the rule would be the particular beha-
vioural answer to the stimulus. And the enactivist takes
this answer to be normative inasmuch as it allows for
the stability of the system. Under the enactivist focus,
any action or response to a stimulus would be part of
the sense-making of the agent, because normativity and
sense-making emerge together. And something is valu-
able in the enactivist sense when it allows for the self-
stability of the system. Thus, any action or specific
behaviour based on movements of the agent as a whole
would be an expression of the rule that allows for the
self-maintenance of the agent. This normativity would
be found through all kinds of behaviours, from percep-
tual to linguistic, given that the enactivist framework
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aims to categorize any cognitive function or ability as a
biological one. This would mean that the student in the
previous example would not be failing to recognize the
symbol ‘+ ’ under his own interpretation – that the
student has developed a behaviour that allows him to
deal with his environment in a way that the student
maintains his own stability. But we all know that the
individual interpretation of the symbol ‘+ ’ offered by
the student is wrong. Following Wittgenstein, we think
that an account of normativity based on individual
interpretations cannot be satisfactory. In order to illus-
trate this, we should come back to the Wittgensteinian
example to conclude that the explanation given by the
student seems deeply paradoxical: if acting according
to a rule is no more than interpreting the rule in such a
way that the action falls under it (in linguistic or beha-
vioural terms), then every action can be made out to
accord with some interpretation of the rule and every
action can also be made to conflict with an interpreta-
tion of the rule. Then there would be neither accord
nor conflict here (no distinction between ‘it seems cor-
rect’ and ‘it is correct’). If acting according to a rule
was no more than subsuming the action under an idio-
syncratic interpretation of the rule, there would be no
distinction between right and wrong and, hence, no
normativity. The concepts ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, which are
tightly connected to the concept of ‘norm’, would be of
no use here. So, if everything is a norm, then nothing is
a norm at all because nobody could distinguish what is
normative from what is not. As Wittgenstein claims in
§201: ‘What this shows is that there is a way of grasping
a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is
exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going
against it’ in actual cases.’ This, applied to the enacti-
vist account of sense-making, would show that there is
no room for error in such a narrow view of normativ-
ity. Given that isolated interpretations of stimuli are
not sufficient to establish a normative framework, we
need to conclude that the particular sense-making of an
agent (let’s say, a bacterium in a gradient of sugar) can-
not be categorized as normative. This point is explicitly
stated by Wittgenstein: ‘Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a
rule would be the same thing as obeying it’ (PI §202).
4 Future work
As we argued in section 3.1, the social plays an essential
role in norm establishing and norm following within a
non-descriptivist view. Once an agent has gone through
these learning and training processes, it acquires the
capacity to correct itself in certain fields; to apply to
itself the criteria shared within a community of agents
that perform the practice. That is, norms have an
intrinsic institutional character, and they are socially
mediated phenomena. Given that non-social agents are
not able to establish and follow their own norms and,
also, given that in many cases an agent needs to be cor-
rected in order to follow a norm properly, we think that
the best explanation of the origins of norms is that they
are natural phenomena located at the social level.9 By
this we mean the level of communities, because it fits
with a plausible empirical explanation of the rest of
conditions required to talk about any normative sphere:
correction, error, training, and the distinction between
epistemic states of being right and wrong via sanctions.
It is worth saying that we can also find this assump-
tion about normativity in the work of other philoso-
phers not directly related with enactivism or with
philosophy of biology. Hubert Dreyfus (2005; 2007,
p. 357) claims that the regulations with the environ-
ment, instead of being conceptual, are normative but
not contentful. For that purpose, he bases his line of
argumentation on the work of phenomenologists like
Merleau-Ponty or Heidegger. Thus, we can find the
idea of normativity without content which is more
closely related to enactivism than to Wittgensteinian
normativity.10 Dreyfus’s problem is, at the end, the
same as the enactivists’: he is committed to the possibil-
ity of private rule following. A review of the normativ-
ity of action in anti-representational cognitive science,
beyond the scope of enactivism, would be a sensible
task that we hope to return to in the future.
Along with these reflections on normativity, there
are other features of the enactive approach that are
worth analysing. Among these features we can high-
light the problem of the mind-life continuum (closely
related to the issues discussed in this paper) and the
shaping of agency. Enactivism, as we have seen, is a
biological account that aims to explain how agents
shape themselves without appealing to any extrinsic
force, such as natural selection. In that sense, enacti-
vism, instead of following Darwin (1859), is much more
related to von Uexku¨ll (1909), the pioneering etholo-
gist. Both enactivism and ethology are concerned with
the relations of agents with their environments in a
recursive, looping way. This looping relationship of the
agent–environment system is also seen in ecological
psychology (Richardson et al., 2008).
While enactivism has focused primarily on the inner
self-production of agency and on the role that the envi-
ronment plays in these processes (Wheeler, 1997), we
are committed to a much more externalist view of the
shaping of agency. Evolutionary biology can explain
not only the features of individual agents but also fea-
tures of populations not by means of inner forces but
by means of laws of nature. Also, we understand that
this externalism is best supported by the idea of niche
construction (Odling-Smee, 2009; Sterelny, 2007),
which is suitable for explaining the biological origins
and emergence of affordances (Reed, 1996). Thus, on
one side, evolutionary biology preserves the externalist
account of ecological psychology and explains its
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biological origins; and on the other side, ecological psy-
chology explains by means of the idea of niche con-
struction how perception (affordances, ecological
information) exerts selective pressure on biological
agents. Although there are enactivist approaches in
biology that have been combined with an ecological
view of perception (Chemero, 2009, pp. 153–154), we
strongly support a purely externalist view of perception
and biology endorsed by the evolutionary and ecologi-
cal approach to explaining the life-cognition connec-
tion. First, because it can explain how affordances are
a feature not only of individual agents, but also of
populations; and second, because it emphasizes the role
of the environment in adaptation, which is significantly
underestimated within the enactive approach.
In fact, we are far from arguing that the enactivist
viewpoint has no place in an anti-representational account
of the life-mind continuum; we are only claiming that it is
not the only anti-representational theory on the market
that is able to explain different aspects of the living. As we
have claimed before (Pinedo & Noble, 2008), a methodo-
logical pluralism is able to answer many more questions
than a misplaced faith in just one theory or family of the-
ories. In that sense, what we defend is that there are genu-
ine questions, such as ‘how is an agent able to keep its
own stability through time?’, that could be answered by
appealing to enactivism. But we believe that it is not
healthy for the endeavour of science and philosophy to
answer different kinds of questions (‘how did this feature
evolve?’, ‘why does this agent behave like that?’, etc.) in
terms of just one kind of concept, theory or process. This
message was clear through this paper in its relation to nor-
mativity in action, but it can also be extended in the future
to a wider explanation of agency than the one offered by
the enactivist authors under review.
5 Conclusion
Given that the individualistic perspective of enactivism
leads to paradoxical situations and that there is no
room for the idea of an individual agent following and
establishing its own norms, we have concluded that the
necessary conditions for real normativity include refer-
ence to a community with shared practices. We have
argued that the consideration of normativity as an insti-
tutional, socially mediated phenomenon fits very well
within the project of naturalizing normativity: norma-
tivity is not a feature of particular and isolated individ-
uals, but a way to understand the behaviour of agents
as members of populations and communities.
We have argued that, in their effort to offer a unified
picture of cognitive processes, enactivism often embraces
an approach to normativity that reduces it to a scientifi-
cally describable feature of cognition. This amounts to
taking normativity for granted as an element that co-
emerges with individuality and action. We have tried to
offer an alternative naturalistic viewpoint that refuses to
countenance normative facts and, hence, avoids natura-
lizing normativity by normativizing nature.
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Notes
1. In this sense, authors as diverse as Canguilhem (1966),
Jonas (1968), Maturana and Varela (1980), Di Paolo
(2005), Barandiaran et al. (2009), No¨e (2004), and
Varela et al. (1991) can be classified as enactivists in a
wide sense.
2. But see his reaction, at the end of his career, to the criti-
cism of retaining an ontological conception of the mind
(Ramberg, 2000; Rorty, 2000).
3. Huw Price’s distinction between ‘object naturalism’ and
‘subject naturalism’ (Price, 2011) is a recent attempt at
highlighting the difference between a reductionist project
that makes every statement answerable to the empirical
discoveries of the natural sciences and a project that stres-
ses the natural character of our explanatory practices.
Price links this distinction to expressivism, the view
according to which many of our natural language terms
(in particular, higher-order concepts that are predicated of
sentences rather than of objects: logical constants, evalua-
tive terms such ‘it’s true that .’, ‘it’s correct to .’, etc.)
play a non-referential role. For a recent defence of expres-
sivism, see Fra´polli and Villanueva (2012). See section 3.1.
4. ‘Queer’ is the term that Wittgenstein uses when he dis-
tances himself from the thesis that intentional attribu-
tions predicate a relation between an agent and an
intentional object (paradigmatically, a proposition).
This is just one of the forms that descriptivism about the
mind can adopt.
5. Note that the force that shapes what it is to be a biologi-
cal being is not an extrinsic force or law like natural
selection but the inner balance and attraction among the
various internal processes (at least in the early stages).
Based on this, we can claim that this perspective is much
more related to biophysics than to evolutionary biology,
because it focuses not on populations but on individuals
and their own inner self-emergent balances. This helps us
to understand why complex-systems modelling has become
in recent years the main tool that provides empirical sup-
port to the enactivists’ claims, and why this approach is so
interested in individual agents rather than in populations.
6. This operational closure implies a thermodynamical
openness (Thompson & Stapleton, 2009). Here we can
find, again, the connection with biophysics.
7. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for warning us
about the importance of addressing more explicitly the
scaling-up problem in this paper.
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8. The term normativity was introduced in the 80s in the
context of Kripke’s (1982) discussion of Wittgenstein’s
rule-following considerations. In this paper, we use the
terms interchangeably.
9. As it has been depicted in previous sections, enactivists
consider that there are socially established rules. For
example, ‘even if the origin of some norms does not fully
lie within the individual (e.g., social norms) it is always
the individual who internalizes them’ (Barandiaran et
al., 2009, p. 6). We consider that, based on this quote:
(1) there is no need to appeal to any kind of internaliza-
tion of the rule and (2) we claim that norms can only be
socially established. For (2), some arguments have been
presented, but for (1), in order to reject the idea of inter-
nalization in a rule-following process, it is also interest-
ing to bring up here the Wittgenstenian example of the
beetle in the box (PI §293). Let us assume that everyone
in their own case knows how to follow a rule because
they have internalized it. Each one would walk around
carrying a box and calling what is inside ‘a beetle’– or,
for our own purposes, ‘a norm’. Nobody can look inside
anyone else’s box, and everyone knows what a norm is
only through looking inside his or her own boxes. On
the other hand, there is no need to look inside our boxes
because in our everyday life we all know how to use the
concept ‘beetle’ or ‘norm’. Suppose that in fact we all
have different things in our boxes, or even imagine that
there is nothing at all in them. Just as the object in the
box plays no role at all in our understanding of how to
use the concept, we do not need to look inside us or to
appeal to any inner state in order to know how to follow
a rule. This is why we claim that even within this enacti-
vist framework, social norms are not properly depicted.
10. It is worth saying that not all Heideggerians claim that
the non-socially mediated and active being-at-hand reg-
ulations with the environment are normativity-loaded.
For example, Wheeler claims, contra Dreyfus (who
classifies the ideas on skilful activity of Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre as being normative but not
conceptual), that the Heideggerian account of skilful
activity cannot be normative in Dreyfus’ sense because
‘[i]n fact Heidegger goes further. For he holds not that
culture is a source of normativity, but that the very idea
of normativity makes sense only in the context of a cul-
ture. For Heidegger, then, the crucial for-the-sake-of-
which relation – the normatively loaded structure that is
at the root of every involvement network and that
involves an act of projective self-interpretation – is itself
cultural in character’ (2005, p. 148). In that sense, this
interpretation of Heidegger would be much more in line
with our Wittgensteinian view than the one offered by
Dreyfus (2007).
References
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to do things with words. Oxford,
UK: Clarendon Press.
Barandiaran, X. E., & Egbert, M. (2013). Norm-establishing
and norm-following in autonomous agency. Artificial Life,
20(1), 5–28.
Barandiaran, X. E., Di Paolo, E., & Rohde, M. (2009). Defin-
ing agency. Individuality, normativity, assymetry and
spatiotemporality in action. Journal of Adaptive Behavior,
17(4), 367–386. In M. Rohde, & T. Ikegami (Eds.), special
issue on Agency in Natural and Artificial Systems.
Barandiaran, X. E., & Moreno, A. (2008). Adaptivity: from
metabolism to behavior. Adaptive Behavior, 16(5),
325–344.
Blackburn, S. (1993). Essays in quasi-realism.Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Brandom, R. B. (1994). Making it explicit. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Brandom, R. B. (2001). Articulating reasons. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Canguilhem, G. (1966). Le normal et le pathologique. Paris,
France: PUF.
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Christensen, W. D., & Bickhard, M. H. (2002). The process
dynamics of normative function. The Monist, 85(1), 3–28.
Cooke, E., & Myin, E. (2011). Is trilled smell possible? How
the structure of olfaction determines the phenomenology of
smell. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18(11–12), 59–95.
Dancy, J. (1993).Moral reasons. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. Oxford, UK: Clar-
endon Press.
Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species. London, UK:
John Murray.
De Jaegher, H., & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-
making. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 6(4),
485–507.
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., & Gallagher, S. (2010). Can
social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in
Cognitive Science, 14(10), 441–447.
Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology,
agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4,
429–452.
Di Paolo, E. (2009). Extended life. Topoi, 28(1), 9–21.
Dreyfus, H. (2005). Overcoming the myth of the mental: how
philosophers can profit from the phenomenology of every-
day expertise (APA Pacific Division Presidential Address
2005). Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 79(2).
Dreyfus, H. (2007). Why Heideggerian AI failed and how fix-
ing it would require making it more Heideggerian. Philoso-
phical Psychology 20(2), 247–268.
Egbert, M., Barandiaran, X. E., & Di Paolo, E. (2012). Beha-
vioral metavolution: the adaptive and evolutionary poten-
tial of metabolism-based chemotaxis. Artificial Life, 18(1),
1–25.
Fra´polli, M. J. (2012). The nature of truth. An updated
approach to the meaning of truth ascriptions. Amsterdam,
The Netherlands: Springer.
Fra´polli, M. J., & Villanueva, N. (2012). Minimal expressi-
vism. Dialectica 66(4), 471–487.
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choises, apt feelings. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Gibbard, A. (2012). Meaning and normativity. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing enactivism.
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Jonas, H. (1968). Biological foundations of individuality.
International Philosophical Quarterly, 8(2), 231–251.
Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Heras-Escribano et al. 31
Maturana, H. (1975). The organization of the living: a theory
of the living organization. International Journal of Man-
Machine Studies, 7(3), 313–332.
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition.
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Reidel.
McDowell, J. (1979). Virtue and reason. The Monist, 62(3),
331–350.
McDowell, J. (1998). Meaning, knowledge and reality. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Noe¨, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
Odling-Smee, J. F. (2009). Niche construction in evolution,
ecosystems and developmental biology. In A. Barberousse,
M. Morange, & T. Pradeu (Eds.), Mapping the Future of
Biology (pp. 69–91). Berlin, Germany: Springer.
O’Regan, K. (2011). Why red doesn’t sound like a bell.
Explaining the feel of consciousness. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Pinedo, M., & Noble, J. (2008). Beyond persons: extending
the personal/subpersonal distinction to non-rational animals
and artificial agents. Biology and Philosophy, 23 (1), 87–100.
Price, H. (2011). Naturalism without mirrors. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Price, H. (2013). Pragmatism, expressivism and naturalism.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, M. J., Fajen, B. R., Shockley, K., Riley, M. A.,
& Turvey, M. T. (2008). Ecological psychology: six princi-
ples for an embodied-embedded approach to behavior. In
P. Calvo, & T. Gomila (Eds.), Handbook of cognitive sci-
ence: An embodied approach. San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Ramberg, B. (2000). Post-ontological philosophy of mind:
Rorty versus Davidson. In R. Brandom (Ed.), Rorty and
his critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Reed, E. S. (1996). Encountering the world. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Rorty, R. (2000) Response to Ramberg. In R. Brandom
(Ed.), Rorty and his critics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ryle, G. (1949/2009). The concept of mind. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Saborido, C., Mossio, M., & Moreno, A. (in press). Biological
organization and cross-generation functions. British Jour-
nal for the Philosophy of Science.
Sterelny, K. (2007). Social intelligence, human intelligence
and niche construction. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London, Series B, 362, 1480, 719–730.
Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E. (Eds.) (2010). Enac-
tion: toward a new paradigm for cognitive science. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: biology, phenomenology
and the sciences of the mind. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap
Press of Harvard University.
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009). Making sense of
sense-making. Reflections on enactive and extended mind
theories. Topoi 28, 23–29.
Travis, C. (2000). Unshadowed thought. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Varela, F. (1979). Principles of biological autonomy. Boston,
MA: Kluwer Academic.
Varela, F. (1997). Patterns of life: intertwining identity and
cognition. Brain and Cognition, 34, 72–87.
Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied
mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Von Uexku¨ll, J. (1909). Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Ber-
lin, Germany: Springer.
Weber, A., & Varela, F. (2002). Life after Kant: natural pur-
poses and the autopoietic foundations of biological indivi-
duality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(2),
97–125.
Wheeler, M. (1997). Cognition’s coming home: the reunion of
life and mind. In P. Husbands, & I. Harvey (Eds.), Pro-
ceedings of the 4th European Conference on Artifical Life
(pp. 10–19), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the cognitive world. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Wittgenstein (1953/2001). Philosophical investigations.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
About the Authors
Manuel Heras-Escribano MA logic and philosophy of science (USC, 2010), MSc neuros-
ciences (UAM, 2012), is a PhD student at the department of philosophy 1, Universidad de
Granada (Spain). His thesis is focused on a conceptual analysis of affordances.
Jason Noble PhD cognitive science (University of Sussex, 1998) was a senior lecturer at the
faculty of electronics and computer sciences, University of Southampton (UK). His research is
focused on the evolution of communication and social learning via agent-based modelling and
artificial life.
For P
32 Adaptive Behavior 23(1)
Manuel de Pinedo PhD cognitive science (University of Sussex, 2000) is tenured professor at
the faculty of philosophy, Universidad de Granada (Spain). His research is focused on the phi-
losophy of mind and epistemology from a pragmatist and post-ontological perspective.
Heras-Escribano et al. 33
